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Abstract In order to better understand relationships between the real economy and
financial economy, it is necessary to formulate a model of financing. New Keyne-
sian theory emphasizes that a firm’s net worth influences investment decisions and
business cycles under an imperfect capital market. We have constructed a dynamic
model from the standpoint of post Keynesian economics. We incorporate a dynamic
equation of a firm’s net worth ratio and investigate financial factors, which give rise
to economic instability. Our results demonstrate that a steady state can be a saddle
point when the dividend rate is low and the bank’s lending reaction to the net worth
ratio is more elastic than investment reaction. When the steady state is the saddle, the
change in the basic discount rate is likely to shift the economy from an unstable path
to a convergence path. Financial policy has a stabilizing effect in the long-run as well
as a positive effect in the short-run.
Keywords Bank behavior · Investment · Unstable economy · Monetary policy
JEL Classification E12 · E44 · E52
1 Introduction
Financial markets in market economies gain in complexity and have significant ef-
fects on the real economy. From the standpoint of new Keynesian economics, Green-
wald and Stiglitz [8] as well as Bernanke and Gertler [3] pointed out that the invest-
ment and output of rational firms depend on the firms’ balance sheet factors under an
imperfect capital market.
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It is hardly new to discuss the interactions between financial markets and the real
economy. Keynes [10] rejected classical economics and indicated the instability of
the real economy; especially, he emphasized the instability of financial markets. In
general, a firm’s behavior depends not only on balance sheet factors, which new Key-
nesian pointed out, but also on bank behavior and other factors.
Minsky [12] analyzed the effects of financial factors on the economy. He alleged
that financial booms and collapses become inevitable in market economies. In this
respect, he is in the post Keynesian group, which emphasizes instability of the econ-
omy. He investigated the financing of investments and the cyclical behavior of the
real economy. He developed a new theory called the financial instability hypothesis,
which involved the argument of Fisher [7] as well as Keynes.
Minsky’s ideas lead to the development of various mathematical models.1 For
example, Taylor and O’Connell [15] and Adachi [1] focused on long-run expectations
and household portfolios. Though Adachi constructed a model with explicit inclusion
of bank behavior, his model is too complex to show concisely the dynamic economy
and stabilizing effects of monetary policy.
In this paper, we highlight net worth, which is line with new Keynesian theory.
However, we focus on the net worth ratio, which is the ratio of net worth to capital
of a firm. One of the purposes of this paper is to build a simple macro model on
the net worth ratio from the standpoint of post Keynesian economics. We investigate
financial factors, which give rise to instability of the economy. We formulate a model
of investment decisions, bank behavior, and financing for better understanding of the
relations between real economy and financial economy.
Our model has assumptions that are similar to Greenwald and Stiglitz. The equity
market is imperfect. Firms cannot raise new equity and normally pay a dividend on
existing shares. Meanwhile, there is a bank lending market. The firms can borrow as
much as they want, but they must pay interests. Hence, the evolution of net worth is
represented by retained earnings.
The second purpose of this paper is to analyze the effectiveness of monetary pol-
icy. We first construct a static model, and then extend to a dynamic model that incor-
porates dynamic equations of both the net worth ratio and bank lending rate.2 This
dynamic model is similar to that of Taylor and O’Connell and Adachi. We investigate
the effects of monetary policy on the short-run and long-run equilibrium; especially,
we consider a stabilizing effect of monetary policy when the steady state is unstable.
Our results demonstrate that the economy can be unstable when the dividend rate
is low and the bank’s lending reaction to the net worth ratio is more elastic than
investment reaction. The latter factor is a feature of our model. When the steady state
is a saddle point, the change in the basic discount rate is likely to shift the economy
from an unstable path to a convergence path.3 We can see that financial policy has a
stabilizing effect in the long-run as well as a positive effect in the short-run.
1Other than Taylor and O’Connell [15] and Adachi [1], discussed below, these include Delli Gatti and
Gallegati [4] and Lavoie [11].
2There are various types of dynamic models. For example, Kaldor [9] is one of the typical dynamic models.
Asada [2] developed a Kaldorian cycle model and investigated the effects of government economic policy.
Our dynamic model differs from them. Instead, we follow Taylor and O’Connell [15] and Adachi [1].
3We describe the interest payment of the central bank advances as the basic discount rate.
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This paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 presents an overview
of the model we are proposing. Section 3 discusses the respective behavior of firms,
banks, and households. We derive the investment function, bank lending function,
and so on. In Sects. 4 and 5, we consider the equilibrium of commodity market and
bank lending market, respectively. Section 6 analyzes the equilibrium of the short-run
economy. Section 7 investigates the instability of economy. We construct a dynamic
system and consider a stabilizing effect of monetary policy. Finally, Sect. 8 summa-
rizes the results.
2 Description of the Model
The economic system in this paper consists of 4 sectors (firms, banks, households,
and central bank) and 5 markets (commodities, bank lending, deposits, cash currency,
and central bank advances).
The firm maximizes the present value of returns from investment and decides a
capital accumulation rate. The investment is financed through either retained earnings
or borrowings from the bank. There is a time-lag between borrowing and interest
payment. The firm pays interest on previous borrowings during present period. The
firm decides the capital accumulation rate and new borrowings from bank during
present period given the existing capital stock and previous bank lending rate.
The bank decides the lending to maximize profits. The household saves in the
form of either deposits or cash currency. We assume that the deposit rate is regulated
and that the bank accepts all deposits, which the household would like to make. In
addition, in the market of central bank advances, we assume that the basic discount
rate is exogenously determined as a means of monetary policy and the central bank
supplies funds, which the bank requests. This type of monetary policy fits with the
concept of “the horizontalist view.”
Table 1 presents simplified balance sheets for economic agents. To analyze our
dynamic system, we specify how the net worth ratio of the firm and the bank lending
rate evolve over time.
3 Structure
3.1 Investment Decisions of Firm4
We assume an imperfectly competitive firm and there is markup pricing at a constant
rate τ over the labor cost. The nominal wage is ω, the labor is N , the output is Y ,
labor-output ratio is n.5 The price level p is given by
p = (1+ τ)ωn, n = N/Y. (1)
The firm makes an investment, given the existing capital stock. The investment
decisions of the firm are made based on expected returns over the periods during
4This formulation follows Adachi [1].
5We assume that τ , ω, and n are constant throughout this paper.
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Table 1 Simplified balance sheets
Central bank Firm
Central bank advances As Bank reserves R
Cash currencyMs












which the newly installed equipment will be used. But they cannot get returns when
they make bad investments and go bankrupt. Let us denote the expected returns of
investment by Q, and the possibility of bankruptcy by σ . The sequence of returns
from investment is given by {Q,(1− σ)Q, (1− σ)2Q, . . .}.




Q(1− σ)j−1/(1+ r)j = Q/(r + σ), (2)
where r is the bank lending rate at which the firm borrows during present period.
We assume that the risk premium σ depends on the net worth ratio z, which is
the ratio of net worth Z to the existing capital stock pK . The firm’s net worth is
the sum of the value of equity Eq and earned surplus Es . The earned surplus is the
accumulation of retained earnings. When the net worth ratio is low, the possibility of
bankruptcy is high. The risk premium is represented by
σ = σ(z), σz < 0, z = Z/pK, (3)
Z = Eq +Es. (4)
Additionally, we assume that the ratio of expected return of investment to the ex-
isting capital stock depends on the capital accumulation rate k which is the investment
per unit of capital. It can be represented by
Q/pK = φ(k), φk > 0, φkk < 0, k = I/K, (5)
where I is the investment. We assume that the marginal efficiency of capital φk de-
creases as k increases.
Taking into account Eqs. (3) and (5) to Eq. (2), we can express the present value
of the net cash flow from investment as
Πf = Q/(r + σ)− pI = [φ(k)/(r + σ(z))− k]pK. (6)
Maximizing Πf with respect to k yields
φk(k) = r + σ(z). (7)
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The left-hand side of Eq. (7) indicates the marginal efficiency of capital and right-
hand side indicates the marginal cost. The capital accumulation rate k can be ex-
pressed as
k = k(r, z), kr < 0, kz > 0. (8)
The capital accumulation rate is a decreasing function of the bank lending rate and
an increasing function of the net worth ratio.
3.2 The Financing of Investment
When the capital market is imperfect, the Modigliani–Miller theorem [13] is not true.
In other words, under an imperfect capital market, the independence of investment
and financing is lost. We have to consider the relations between investment and fi-
nancing.
We assume that the equity is issued only when the firm is established. The firm
cannot raise new equity and pay a dividend on existing shares. On the other hand,
there is a bank lending market. The firm borrows from a bank and pays interests.6
All investments must be financed through either retained earnings or borrowings
from bank. This is represented by
pI = F +Ld, (9)
where F is retained earnings and Ld is new borrowings from the bank during the
present period. The total borrowings Ld are written as
Ld = L+Ld, (10)
where L is debt.
The retained earnings are calculated as the difference between the total income and
the sum of labor costs, the interest payment, and the dividend. This is represented by
F = pY −ωN − r¯L− V, (11)
where r¯ is the bank lending rate during the previous period and V is the dividend.
The firm distributes the constant rate v of profit as a dividend to shareholders. We
can express the dividend as
V = v(pY −ωN − r¯L). (12)
Substituting Eq. (12) into Eq. (11), we obtain
F = (1− v)(pY −ωN − r¯L). (11′)
Additionally, substituting Eqs. (1), (10) and (11′) into Eq. (9) and dividing by pK ,
we obtain





y − (1− v)r¯l + ld − l, y = Y/K, l = L/pK, ld = Ld/pK,
(13)
6As discussed in the Introduction, these assumptions are based on Greenwald and Stiglitz [8].
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where y is output-capital ratio and l is debt-capital ratio.
From the firm’s balance sheet, the debt-capital ratio l is equal to 1 minus net worth
ratio. This is represented by
l = 1− z. (14)
Substituting Eqs. (8) and (14) into Eq. (13), we can express the borrowing demand
function as7





y + {(1− v)r¯ + 1}(1− z),
ldy < 0, l
d
r < 0, l
d
z  0, ldr¯ > 0.
(15)
The borrowings from bank are a decreasing function of the bank lending rate dur-
ing the present period and an increasing function of the bank lending rate in the pre-
vious period. The effect of net worth ratio will be ambiguous, because the increase of
net worth ratio has effects on increase of investment as well as decrease of existing
debt.
3.3 Bank Behavior
Like firms, banks seek profits. The bank earns revenue from lending to firms and
makes interest payments to depositors and the central bank. We take into account
the transition costs G. The costs involve auditing and monitoring costs to firms and
losses in the event of corporate failures.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the deposit interest is regulated and bank
accepts all deposits, which the household would like to make. The profit of bank per
unit of capital πb is given by
πb = rlb − iddh − iaab − g,
πb = Πb/pK, lb = Lb/pK,dh = Dh/pK,ab = Ab/pK,g = G/pK,
(16)
where Πb is profit of bank, Lb is bank lending, id is deposit rate, Dh is deposit from
the household, ia is the basic discount rate, and Ab is the central bank advances.
Let us consider the cost function g. First, the costs in auditing and monitoring gen-
erally depend on the level of bank lending. We assume that the cost g is an increasing
function of bank lending-capital ratio. Second, the bank’s risk premium for lending
is high when the bank estimates that the possibility of the firm’s bankruptcy is high.
We assume that the bank’s risk premium depends on the net worth ratio of the firm.
When the net worth ratio is low, the bank’s risk premium becomes high. The cost g
increases as the net worth ratio decreases. Then the cost function g is written as
g = g(lb, z), glb > 0, glblb > 0, gz < 0, glbz < 0. (17)
7We suppose that investment exceeds retained earnings. In other words, ld > 0.
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We assume that the marginal cost of bank lending increases more than proportion-
ally as lb increases and decreases as z increases.
Substituting Eq. (17) into Eq. (16), we have
πb = rlb − iddh − iaab − g(lb, z). (18)
On the other hand, from bank’s balance sheet, we have
Lb +R = Dh +Ab, (19)
where R is bank reserves. The bank reserves must be satisfied legal reserve. This is
represented by
R = θDh, (20)
where θ is legal reserve rate.
Substituting Eq. (20) into Eq. (19) and dividing by pK , we obtain
lb = (1− θ)dh + ab. (21)
To sum up, the problem of bank is to maximize Eq. (18) subject to constraints
in Eq. (21). In this problem, bank lending lb and the central bank advances ab are




)= r − ia. (22)
The bank lending can be expressed as
lb = lb(r, z, ia), lbr > 0, lbz > 0, lbia < 0. (23)
Bank lending is an increasing function of the bank lending rate and net worth ratio
and a decreasing function of the basic discount rate.
3.4 Household Behavior
The household allocates wealth across deposits Dh and cash currency Mh. The
present wealth of the household W is the sum of wealth at beginning of period W¯
and savings during the present period pSh. This is represented by
W = W¯ + pSh. (24)
Since we assume that equity is issued only when the firm is established, the amount
of equity Eq remains unchanged. Therefore, the amount of the present wealth except
for the value of equity is allocated to deposits and cash currency. This is represented
by
W −Eq = Dh +Mh. (25)
First, let us consider wealth at the beginning of period W¯ . Taking into account the
economy as a whole, the assets which one has is the liability which another has. From
the balance sheets of overall economy, the following equation is satisfied:
pK = W¯ +Es. (26)
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On the other hand, from the firm’s balance sheet, we have
pK = Eq +Es +L. (27)
Substituting Eqs. (26) and (27) into Eq. (24), we obtain
W −Eq = L+ pSh. (28)
Additionally, taking into account Eqs. (4) and (27), we have
W −Eq = pK −Z + pSh. (28′)
Let us next consider present savings of the household pSh. The gross income of
the firm is distributed to wage and firms’ profit. The firm pays interests on bank lend-
ing from their profit. The remainder is distributed to stockholders as dividends or held
back as retained earnings. We assume that bank revenues shall invest in the house-
hold via bank’s labor cost and other factors. From these assumptions, the household
income pYh is equal to the gross income minus retained earnings of the firm. This is
represented by
pYh = pY − (1− v)(pY −ωN − r¯L). (29)
We assume that consumption of the economy as a whole is equal to wage income.
The consumption function is written by
pC = ωN. (30)
Taking into account Eqs. (29) and (30), the savings of the household are expressed
as
pSh = r¯L+ v(pY −ωN − r¯L). (31)
From Eqs. (28′) and (31), the present wealth of the household except for the value
of equity is expressed as
W −Eq = pK −Z + r¯L+ v(pY −ωN − r¯L). (32)
The portfolio behavior functions follow Tobin [16]. We express the ratio of deposit
demand to the household’s wealth except for the amount of equity as δ and assume
that δ is an increasing function of deposit rate id . The demand functions of deposit
and cash currency are respectively expressed by
Dh = δ(id)(W −Eq), δid > 0, (33a)
Mh = (1− δ(id))(W −Eq). (33b)
Taking into account of Eq. (32) and dividing Eqs. (33a) and (33b) by pK , we have
dh = δ(id)[v( τ
1+ τ
)
y + {(1− v)r¯ + 1}(1− z)],
dh
id
> 0, dhz < 0, d
h
y > 0, d
h
r¯ > 0, d
h = Dh/pK,
(33a′)
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mh = {1− δ(id)}[v( τ
1+ τ
)
y + {(1− v)r¯ + 1}(1− z)],
mh
id







Since the increase of net worth ratio decreases present household’s wealth, both
deposits and currency demands will decrease. In contrast, both demands will increase
responding to the increase of output-capital ratio and previous bank lending rate.
4 Equilibrium of Commodity Market
This economic system consists of 5 markets; commodities, bank lending, deposits,
cash currency, and central bank advances. We assume that the deposit rate is regu-
lated and that bank accepts all deposits, which the household would like to make.
The supply of deposits is constrained by demand. Similarly, we assume that the ba-
sic discount rate is exogenously determined as a means of monetary policy and the
central bank supplies funds, which the bank requests.
Therefore, we will consider the equilibriums of 3 markets: commodities, bank
lending, and cash currency. Taking into account Walras’ law, we can suppress the
analysis of cash currency market. We will consider the commodity market and bank
lending market.
Let us first consider the commodity market. The commodity market achieves equi-
librium when investments and savings are equal. The savings of the economy pS are
equal to the sum of the household’s savings and retained earnings of the firm. This is
represented by
pS = r¯L+ v(pY −ωN − r¯L)+ (1− v)(pY −ωN − r¯L) = pY −ωN. (34)









Taking into account Eqs. (8) and (35), we can express the balance equation of







When there is excess demand, output-capital ratio y will go up. This adjustment
process is represented by
y˙ = H(y, r) = k(r, z)− τ
1+ τ y. (37)
We assume the following condition is satisfied in commodity market to stabilize
the adjustment process:
Hy = − τ
1+ τ < 0. (38)
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Fig. 1 IS curve
This condition is satisfied at all times. We will draw the balance equation of com-
modity market on Oyr plane in Fig. 1. The slope is downward sloping. We shall
call this curve IS curve. When the net worth ratio increases, the IS curve will shift
rightward as shown in Fig. 1.
5 Equilibrium of Financial Markets
Let us next consider bank lending market as financial market. Taking into account
Eqs. (15) and (23), we can express the balance equation of bank lending market as
follows:





y + {(1− v)r¯ + 1}(1− z) = lb(r, z, ia). (39)
When there is excess demand, the bank lending rate r will go up. This adjustment
process is represented by





y+{(1−v)r¯+1}(1−z)− lb(r, z, ia). (40)
We assume the following condition is satisfied in bank lending market to stabilize
the adjustment process:
Xr = kr − lbr < 0. (41)
This condition is satisfied at all times. We will draw the balance equation of bank
lending market in Fig. 2. The slope is downward sloping. We shall call this curve BL
curve. When the basic discount rate and the previous bank loan rate increase, the BL
curve will shift upward as shown in Fig. 2. On the other hand, the effect of the net
worth ratio on the BL curve is ambiguous. The increase of net worth ratio will result
in an increase of both bank lending and investment. When the former effect is larger
than the latter effect, the BL curve will shift downward.
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Fig. 2 BL curve
6 Short-Run Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
We will now consider short-run equilibrium. The system comprises Eqs. (36) and
(39) and determines output-capital ratio y and bank lending rate r .
We will first consider the stability of short-run equilibrium. Dynamic equations in
a disequilibrium situation are expressed by Eqs. (37) and (40). We can confirm that
the short-run equilibrium is stable.8 We can express the short-run equilibrium as
y = y(z, r¯, ia),
yz > 0, yr¯ < 0, yia < 0,
(42a)
r = r(z, r¯, ia),
rz  0, rr¯ > 0, ria > 0.
(42b)
Figure 3 depicts the short-run equilibrium. The slope of IS curve is higher than
that of BL curve when the stability conditions are satisfied.
Let us examine the effect of exogenous variables on short-run equilibrium. When
the previous bank lending rate r¯ and the basic discount rate ia rise, the BL curve will
shift upward. The output-capital ratio will decrease and the present bank lending rate
will increase.
We shall examine how the net worth ratio z affects the output-capital ratio and
bank lending rate. Though the shift of BL curve is ambiguous when the net worth ratio
rises, the output-capital ratio will increase. But the effect on bank lending rate will
be ambiguous.9 When the effect on bank lending is larger than that on investment,
the bank lending rate will decrease. As shown in the following section, the economy
can become unstable when the increase of net worth ratio decreases the bank lending
rate.





. When the effect of lbz is larger than that of kz , rz will be negative.
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Fig. 3 Short-run equilibrium
From the static model, we can see that the firm’s balance sheet elements and bank
behavior significantly affect the real economy as Minsky alleged. In the next section,
we will investigate the unstable economy by using a dynamic model.
Proposition 1 In the short-run, when the net worth ratio rises, the output-capital
ratio will increase. Additionally, when the previous bank lending rate and the basic
discount rate rise, the output-capital ratio will decrease and the present bank lending
rate will increase.
7 Dynamic Model
7.1 Stability of Steady State
In this section, we construct a dynamic model to investigate the mechanism of finan-
cial instability. We shall analyze the characteristics of steady state in our model.10
In the discussions so far, we treated the net worth ratio z and previous bank lending
rate r¯ as exogenous variables. To analyze the dynamic system, we have to specify how
the net worth ratio z and previous bank lending rate r¯ evolve over time.11
Let us first derive the dynamic equation of the net worth ratio. Taking the logarith-














10We assume that there is a unique steady state.
11Although we present a continuous model in this paper, we can also construct a discrete model. Whether
the model is continuous or discrete, we can obtain similar results.
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where a dot above a variable denotes a time derivative. Since we assume the equity is
constant, the evolution of net worth Z is equal to the retained earnings. Taking into
account Eq. (4), we have
Z˙ = E˙s = F = (1− v)(pY −ωN − r¯L). (44)
Substituting Eq. (44) into Eq. (43), we obtain
z˙ = (1− v)
{
τ
1+ τ y − r¯(1− z)
}
− zk(r, z). (45)
On the other hand, we suppose that the evolution of previous bank lending rate
can be expressed as
˙¯r = r − r¯ . (46)
Substituting Eqs. (42a) and (42b) into Eqs. (45) and (46), we obtain a dynamic
model which comprises two differential equations,
z˙ = F (z, r¯; ia), (47a)
˙¯r = R(z, r¯; ia). (47b)











At the steady state (z∗, r¯∗), evolution of net worth and the capital are the same.
The net worth ratio and bank lending rate remain constant.
Making linear approximation of the dynamic model near the steady state to ana-


















The values of each element are appreciated at the steady state. Taking into account
the results of static model, we can express the values as follows:13





yz + (1− v)r¯ − k, (50a)





yr¯ − (1− v)(1− z), (50b)
12We suppose that the retained earnings F , the net worth ratio z∗, and capital accumulation rate k∗ are
positive at the steady state.
13For convenience, we omit the asterisks which express the values of the steady state. Appendix 2 outlines
the process to derive Eqs. (50a) and (50b).
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R1 = rz, (50c)
R2 = rr¯ − 1. (50d)
We assume that the following condition is satisfied at the steady state:14
1− z− v > 0. (51)
The system is stable if the following conditions are satisfied:
F1 +R2 < 0, (52a)
F1 ·R2 − F2 ·R1 > 0. (52b)
But there is no assurance that these conditions are satisfied. The sign of left-hand
side of (52b) depends on the value in the following manner:








− (1− v)r¯{lbr − (1− z)kr}+ (1− v)(1− z)(kz − lbz )+ k(lbr − vkr). (53)
When the sign of U is negative, the system is unstable. Taking into account con-
dition (51), it is negative when the absolute value of lbz exceeds the value of kz and
v is low. In other words, we can point out financial factors that make an economy
unstable as follows:
(1) The bank lending reaction to the net worth ratio exceeds the investment reaction.
(2) Dividend rate is low.
From the static model, we can confirm that these factors make the bank lending
rate decrease responding to an increase of the net worth ratio.
On the basis of Minsky’s argument, we will investigate the unstable economy. Let
us analyze by using a phase diagram. When rz is negative, R1 will be also negative.
Suppose that F1 > 0, and R2 < 0, the locus of z˙ = 0 is upward sloping and that of˙¯r = 0 is downward sloping as shown in Fig. 4. The intersection of these loci denoted
by E∗ represents the steady state.
The steady state E∗(z∗, r¯∗) becomes a saddle point and there is a unique path that
converges to it. For example, the economy A can converge to the steady state. But it
is unusual for the economy to be on the saddle path. The gaps between the economies
on the convergence path and the others will expand cumulatively as time goes by.
Let us consider economy B in Fig. 4. The net worth ratio tends to increase in the
situation of economy B . The firm increases investment and bank lending increases.
The output of the economy and firm’s profit will increase. As demand for funds in-
crease, the bank lending rate rises. This in turn causes investment to decrease. After
a while, the firm gets into the red and the net worth ratio will begin to decrease.
The bank lending rate will become increasingly higher. The economy continues to
decline.
14From this assumption, F2 becomes negative.
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Fig. 4 Steady state
Fig. 5 The effectiveness of
monetary policy
Proposition 2 The dynamic system which consists of the net worth ratio of firm and
the bank lending rate may be unstable when the dividend rate is low and the bank
lending reaction to the net worth ratio is more elastic than investment reaction.
7.2 Comparative Analysis of the Steady State
Finally, let us analyze the effect of monetary policy on the steady state. We will focus
on the effect of the decrease of the basic discount rate ia .
When the basic discount rate decreases, the z˙ = 0 curve will shift leftward and
˙¯r = 0 curve downward, as shown in Fig. 5. The net worth ratio at the steady state will
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The change in the basic discount rate makes the saddle path shift up. Let us show
Fig. 5. The economy B was on the divergence path at first as shown in Fig. 4, now
is on the convergence path. The reason is that the decrease of the basic discount rate
suppresses the excessive increase of bank lending rate. We can see that the monetary
policy has a stabilizing effect on the economy.
Proposition 3 When the steady state is a saddle point, the change in the basic dis-
count rate is likely to shift the economy from an unstable path to a convergence path.
The monetary policy has a stabilizing effect.
8 Conclusions
We constructed a simple macro model on the net worth ratio of the firm. As a result,
we have shown that the increase of net worth ratio increases the output-capital ratio in
the short-run. Additionally, we pointed out that the excessive reaction of bank lending
to the net worth ratio constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for the economy.
We can reconfirm that these results agree well with aspects of Minsky’s theory.
It is said that we have to have some regulations on bank behavior to stabilize the
economy in the long run.
On the other hand, recently, from the view of stock-flow consistent (SFC) ap-
proach, it has been pointed out that traditional models such as Taylor and O’Connell
often assume oversimplified hypotheses that do not do justice to Minsky’s literary
analyzes and do not consider the logical implications of these hypotheses.15
The SFC models are based on accounting frameworks that consistently integrate
financial flows of funds with a full set of balance sheets. They show the logical in-
terrelations between the transactions among the sectors. Passarella [14] analyzed the
impact of both capital-asset inflation and consumer credit on the financial soundness
of the business sector. We do not take into consideration these elements.
Our model is closer to a traditional model. We must construct a model that is
applicable to the analysis of macroeconomic policies.
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Appendix 1: The Proof of the Stability of Short-Run Equilibrium
Making linear approximation of Eqs. (37) and (40) near the short-run equilibrium,
we have the following coefficient matrix T :
T =
( − τ1+τ kr
− (1−v)τ1+τ kr − lbr
)
. (A.1)
The values of each element are appreciated at the short-run equilibrium. The sys-
tem is stable if Eqs. (38) and (41) are satisfied and the determinant of matrix T is
positive. The latter condition is represented by
det(T ) > 0. (A.2)
We can confirm that Eq. (A.2) is satisfied.
Appendix 2: The Process to Derive Eqs. (50a) and (50b)
Making linear approximation of dynamic model near the steady state to analyze sta-


















F1 = (1− v)
{
τ
1+ τ yz + r¯
}
− z(kr · rz + kz)− k, (B.2)
F2 = (1− v)
{
τ
1+ τ yr¯ − (1− z)
}
− z(kr · rr¯ ). (B.3)
The values of each element are appreciated at the steady state. Taking into account
the results of static model, we can rewrite Eqs. (B.2) and (B.3) as Eqs. (50a) and (50b)
in the main text.
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